PGP is still considered secure when using modern settings (AES-256, RSA-4096, SHA-256+). Legacy algorithms like SHA-1, 3DES, and older RSA key sizes (1024-bit) shouldn't be used whatsoever. It should be noted that PGP isn't necessarily post-quantum safe in its current state. RSA, ElGamal, and DSA rely on mathematical problems (integer factorization, discrete logarithms) that can be broken by Shor's algorithm if a large enough quantum computer is built. Grover's algorithm only weakens AES-256 slightly (but can break AES-128), but doesn't quite break it as far as I know. Hash functions like SHA-256+ are safe, I believe. Despite these concerns, I do think OpenPGP and GnuPG are exploring post-quantum cryptographic alternatives (e.g., Kyber, Dilithium, SPHINCS+) or a hybrid encryption model by mixing quantum-safe and traditional encryption. I don't know what the current state is for GnuPG, but you can track an OpenPGP draft for implementing PQC algorithms here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra...f-openpgp-pqc/. Until PQC is finalized, RSA-4096 + AES-256 + SHA-512 + ZLIB or BZIP2 (for compression) in a PGP setup is the most secure. ECC is more efficient but could be more vulnerable to quantum attacks than larger RSA keys, hence why I suggested RSA-4096 over ECC. If I'm wrong, someone will correct me.
Edit: Looks like until PQC is natively supported in OpenPGP, there's this project which looks interesting. I'll be looking into it myself soon.